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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Marcelino B. Baeza appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age.  
On appeal, Baeza claims the district court violated his due process rights when it 
permitted the six-year-old victim to testify via closed-circuit television pursuant to 
the Uniform Child Witness Testimony by Alternative Methods Act, I.C. §§ 9-1801, 
et seq. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 In July 2013, six-year-old J.C. was playing at her uncle’s house when her 
uncle, Baeza, brought her ice cream, pulled down her underwear and touched 
her privates.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 343, Ls. 6-21, p. 347, L. 22 – p. 348, L. 1.)  Baeza 
touched J.C. several times.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 345, L. 17 – p. 346, L. 12.)  When 
Baeza’s wife came home, Baeza quickly pulled up J.C.’s underwear and went 
into the kitchen.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 348, Ls. 2-13.) 
When J.C. got back to her home she went straight to the bathroom.  
(8/12/14 Tr., p. 370, Ls. 14-16.)  J.C.’s father, Antonio Corona, called for J.C.’s 
mother, Jesus Patlan-Baeza, because J.C. was crying and something was 
wrong.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 370, L. 21 – p. 371, L. 14.)  When Ms. Patlan-Baeza 
entered the bathroom, she saw the toilet bowl was full of blood.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 
371, L. 20 – p. 372, L. 2.)  Ms. Patlan-Baeza took J.C. to the bedroom and 
checked her underwear.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 372, Ls. 6-16.)  J.C.’s underwear was 
bloody.  (Id.)  Ms. Patlan-Baeza checked J.C.’s vagina and saw more blood.  
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(8/12/14 Tr., p. 372, Ls. 17-21.)  Ms. Patlan-Baeza asked J.C. if anyone touched 
her, and she said her uncle Baeza touched her.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 372, L. 24 – p. 
375, L. 7.)  J.C. said Baeza touched her “bum” and her “colita,” a Spanish word 
for private parts.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 373, L. 5 – p. 374, L. 1.)  J.C. was crying and 
said she was in pain.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 374, Ls. 2-6.)  J.C.’s father hugged her.  
(8/12/14 Tr., p. 374, Ls. 7-9.)  J.C. told her parents what Baeza did to her.  
(8/12/14 Tr., p. 374, Ls. 16-24.)  J.C.’s parents grabbed the children and drove to 
Baeza’s house to confront him.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 374, L. 21 – p. 375, L. 7.)  Baeza 
denied doing anything wrong and said he only gave J.C. an ice cream.  (8/12/14 
Tr., p. 376, Ls. 11-20.)   
Police responded, and Baeza was transported to the Hailey Police 
Department where he was interviewed.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 434, Ls. 17-25.)  
Paramedics arrived and took J.C. to the hospital in an ambulance.  (8/12/14 Tr., 
p. 440, L. 13 – p. 441, L. 5.)   
At the hospital, J.C. was examined by Angela Brady, the sexual assault 
nurse, and Dr. Robertson, an emergency room physician.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 537, L. 
16 – p. 538, L. 4.)  Dr. Robertson observed a small abrasion inside of J.C.’s 
vagina.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 544, Ls. 4-25.)  The abrasion could have been caused 
by something penetrating her vagina.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 550, Ls. 18-24.)   
Sergeant Ornales interviewed Baeza and Baeza attempted to provide 
several explanations for J.C’s injury.  He first claimed that the stick shift in his 
truck could have caused the injury to J.C. or that J.C. was injured when he 
helped her out of his truck. (8/13/14 Tr., p. 470, L. 23 – p. 473, L. 17.)  Baeza 
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then claimed that piggyback rides could have caused J.C.’s injuries or J.C could 
have fallen and hurt herself.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 473, L. 18 – p. 474, L. 24.)  Baeza 
then finally stated that J.C. could have been injured when Baeza pushed J.C. on 
the couch, and it was possible that his hand slipped under J.C.’s underwear and 
made penetration.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 475, L. 11 – p. 477, L. 11.)  During the 
interview with Sergeant Ornales, Baeza stated J.C.’s injuries were unintentional 
and that he had “screwed up.”  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 479, L. 4 – p. 480, L. 8.) 
A grand jury indicted Baeza for two counts of lewd conduct with a minor 
under sixteen years of age.  (R., pp. 48-49.)  Count One alleged manual to 
genital contact and Count Two alleged manual to anal contact.  (Id.)   
The state filed a Motion for Hearing to Allow Child Witness Testimony By 
Alternative Method.  (R., pp. 149-150)  Tami Kammer, a licensed clinical 
professional counselor, testified at the hearing that she was currently treating 
J.C. for sexual trauma and J.C. was suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  (1/16/14 Tr., p. 13, L. 12 – p. 14, L. 22.)  Ms. Kammer testified that 
prior to July 2013, J.C. was able to sleep alone in her room, but she could not 
sleep alone since July 2013.  (1/16/14 Tr., p. 14, L. 23 – p. 15, L. 18.)  After July 
2013, J.C. soiled her pants, was afraid to leave her parents and had nightmares.  
(Id.)  These conditions did not exist prior to July 2013.  (Id.)  Ms. Kammer 
testified it would re-traumatize J.C. to testify in open court and would make the 
trauma treatment more difficult.  (Id.)  Ms. Kammer also testified that J.C. was 
fearful of Baeza.  (1/16/14 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 14-17.)  Ms. Kammer did not 
recommend that J.C. testify in open court or in front of Baeza.  (1/16/14 Tr., p. 
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17, Ls. 18-22.)  After J.C. testified at the grand jury, J.C. “fell apart.”  (1/16/14 Tr., 
p. 21, Ls. 6-11.)  Ms. Kammer testified that post-traumatic stress was different 
for J.C. than for an adult because a “child does not have the ability to 
differentiate as well as an adult between reality and a discussion of.”  (1/16/14 
Tr., p. 20, L. 19 – p. 21, L. 5.)  Testifying in court could be “further damaging” to 
J.C.  (1/16/14 Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – p. 17, L. 5.)   
 The district court accepted Ms. Kammer’s testimony and found by “clear 
and convicting evidence that the child would suffer serious emotional trauma that 
would substantially impair the child’s ability to communicate with the finder of fact 
if required to be confronted face-to-face with the defendant.”  (R., pp. 195-196.)  
The district court next “thoroughly considered all of the factors listed in I.C. § 9-
1806[],” including the relative rights of the parties.  (R., pp. 196-197.)  The district 
court ruled that Baeza would not be present in court during J.C.’s testimony but 
would watch J.C.’s testimony in a separate room via closed-circuit television.  
(R., pp. 197-198.)  The district court ordered that Baeza should have some 
method to communicate with his attorney while he was in the separate room.  
(Id.)   
The state then filed a Motion to Close Trial and to Allow Child Friendly 
Procedures During Victim’s Testimony.  (R., pp. 225-228.)  The district court 
considered whether the jury may draw inferences regarding the procedures used 
during J.C.’s testimony and invited Baeza to provide a jury instruction that would 
provide a neutral explanation as to the alternate procedures.  (4/15/14 Tr., p. 18, 
L. 14 – p. 19, L. 6.)  Baeza did not want a jury instruction.  (Id.)  The district court 
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entered a second pretrial order in which it provided additional details regarding 
the procedures for the alternate testimony method.  (R., pp. 239-242.)  Prior to 
trial the presiding judge recused himself and the case was reassigned.  (R., pp. 
281-282.)   
Baeza filed a motion to reconsider the district court’s ruling on the State’s 
Motion to Allow Alternative Testimony.  (R., pp. 327-328.)  The district court held 
a hearing on Baeza’s motion.  (7/1/14 Tr., p. 8, L. 5 – p. 47, L. 6.)  The district 
court entered an “Order Re: Testimony By Alternate Method.”  (R., pp. 409-417.)  
The district court held, “there is clear and convincing evidence that the child 
could suffer serious emotional trauma that would substantially impair her ability 
to communicate with the jury if she is required to be confronted face-to-face by 
the Defendant.”  (R., p. 413.)   
The district court then considered the factors in Idaho Code § 9-1806 and 
ordered that J.C. would be allowed to testify via an alternative method.  (R., pp. 
413-414.)  The district court changed the alternate method of J.C.’s testimony.  
(R., pp. 414-415.)  The previous decision ordered that J.C. would testify in open 
court and Baeza would be moved to a different room.  (R., pp. 197-198, 240-
241.)  The district court altered the previous order and ordered that now J.C. 
would be placed in a different room and testify via closed-circuit television.  (R., 
pp. 414-416.)  The jury, the court, the defendant, and the attorneys would all be 
present in the courtroom.  (Id.)  The district court modeled this procedure on the 
procedure outlined in Idaho Criminal Rule 43.3, which allows forensic testimony 
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by video conference.  (R., pp. 412-416.)  The district court reasoned that this 
new procedure would better protect Baeza’s rights.  (Id.)   
At trial, prior to J.C.’s testimony the district instructed the jury not to give 
any different weight to J.C.’s testimony because of the “child-friendly procedures 
used during her testimony”:   
THE COURT: And, ladies and gentlemen, it’s going to be obvious 
in a second, but [J.C.] is going to testify over a video link. There 
should be audio. So you’re going to see that. And if we have to 
deal with that during the testimony, please bear with us. 
 
But I do have an instruction regarding that for you. So the 
instruction as to the testimony is this: Do not give any different 
weight to [J.C.’s] testimony because of the child-friendly procedures 
used during her testimony. 
 
(8/12/14 Tr., p. 333, L. 19 – p. 334, L. 4.)   
J.C. testified that Baeza brought her ice cream then touched her private 
parts.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 343, Ls. 6-21.)   
Q. And after Uncle Marcelino [Baeza] brought you ice cream in the 
living room did anything happen between you and Uncle 
Marcelino? 
 
A. He touched me. 
 
Q. And when you say he touched me, can you tell me who it was 
that touched you, [J.C.]? 
 
A. My Uncle Marcelino. 
 
Q. [J.C.], tell me what it was that he touched you with. 
 
A. With his finger. 
 
Q. Where was it that he touched you, [J.C.]? 
 
A. In my bum. 
 
Q. Okay. And did he touch you anywhere else, [J.C.]? 
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A. He just touched me here and here. 
 
Q. Okay. 
 
(Id.)  When J.C. said Baeza “touched [her] here and here” she “pointed to the 
front of her private parts and to the back of her private parts.”  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 
343, L. 22 – p. 344, L. 4.)  She testified that Baeza touched her private parts 
“several times.”  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 345, L. 17 – p. 346, L. 12.)  Baeza touched her 
underneath her clothes.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 347, Ls. 2-5.)   
Jesus Patlan-Baeza, J.C.’s mother, testified that J.C. was in pain and 
crying and told her that Baeza touched her private parts.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 372, L. 
22 – p. 374, L. 6.1)  Antonio Corona, J.C.’s father, also testified that J.C. told him 
that her uncle Baeza stuck his fingers in her vagina.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 409, Ls. 1-
4.)   
Officer Skuza testified that he spoke with Baeza and Baeza “appeared 
nervous, wouldn’t make eye contact, kind of appeared to be clammy and a little 
shaky.”  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 434, Ls. 7-12.)  Officer Stewart testified that he also 
observed Baeza was shaky and “a little bit nervous.”  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 439, Ls.9-
13.)    
Teresa Garen, an interpreter working at the emergency room at Saint 
Luke’s hospital, testified that J.C. told her that “he” touched her bottom and 
vagina with his fingers.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 507, L. 20 – p. 509, L. 14, p. 512, Ls. 2-
                                            
1 J.C.’s statements to her father and mother were admitted under the excited 
utterance hearsay exception.  (R., p. 170.)  This ruling has not been challenged 
on appeal. 
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22.)  Angela Brady, a nurse at the Saint Luke’s emergency room, testified that 
J.C. told her that Baeza caused her injuries.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 529, Ls. 19-25.)   
After the close of evidence, the district court again gave an instruction 
regarding J.C.’s testimony:   
THE COURT: Do not give any different weight to [J.C.’s] testimony 
because of the child-friendly procedures used during her testimony. 
 
(8/14/14 Tr., p. 672, Ls. 20-22.)  The jury found Baeza guilty of Count I, Lewd 
Conduct for manual to genital contact, but not guilty of Count II, Lewd Conduct 
for manual to anal contact.  (R., p. 495.)  The district court sentenced Baeza to 
twenty years with ten years fixed (R., pp. 531-535.)  Baeza timely appealed.  (R., 
pp. 541-543.)  
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ISSUE 
 
Baeza states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court’s order allowing J.C. to testify against Mr. 
Baeza at trial by the alternative method of closed circuit television 
violate Mr. Baeza’s due process right to a fair trial because the 
alternate method infringed on his presumption of innocence?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Baeza failed to show that allowing J.C. to testify via closed-circuit 
television violated his due process rights?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
Baeza Has Failed To Show The District Court’s Order Allowing J.C. To Testify 
Pursuant To The Uniform Child Witness Testimony By Alternative Methods Act 
Violated His Due Process Rights 
 
A. Introduction 
 The state charged Baeza with lewd conduct against his six-year-old niece, 
J.C.  (R., pp. 48-49.)  After a hearing, the district court permitted J.C. to testify via 
closed-circuit television pursuant to the Uniform Child Witness Testimony by 
Alternative Methods Act.  (R., pp. 193-199, 239-242, 409-417.)  On appeal, 
Baeza argues that the order allowing J.C. to testify via closed-circuit television 
infringed on his due process rights and presumption of innocence because the 
alternate procedure implied to the jury he was guilty.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-
28.)  Baeza is incorrect.  Allowing a six-year-old special accommodations when 
testifying did not imply Baeza was guilty.  The district court provided a neutral 
explanation regarding the form of J.C.’s testimony.  The district court instructed 
the jury not to give any different weight to J.C.’s testimony “because of the child-
friendly procedures used during her testimony.” (8/12/14 Tr., p. 333, L. 19 – p. 
334, L. 4; 8/14/14 Tr., p. 672, Ls. 20-22.)  Further, the alternate procedure was 
necessary to further an important state policy, namely the protection of a child 
sexual abuse victim when testifying.  Regardless, even if there was error, the 
error was harmless because the result of the trial would have been the same 
regardless of the method by which J.C. testified.   
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
Questions of constitutional law are subject to free review on appeal.  State 
v. Doe, 157 Idaho 43, 49, 333 P.3d 858, 864 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. 
O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990); State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 
288, 292–93, 955 P.2d 603, 607-08 (Ct. App. 1997)). 
 
C. Allowing J.C. To Testify Pursuant To The Uniform Child Witness 
Testimony By Alternative Methods Act Did Not Violate Baeza’s Due 
Process Rights 
 
 The district court considered all of the factors required under the Uniform 
Child Witness Testimony by Alternative Methods Act, Idaho Code §§ 9-1801, et 
seq. and determined that six-year-old J.C. would be allowed to testify via 
alternate means.  (See R., pp. 193-198, 239-242, 409-417.)  Baeza argues on 
appeal that the alternative method used to present J.C.’s testimony violated 
Baeza’s right to a presumption of innocence because having a child testify via 
closed-circuit television is inherently prejudicial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-20.2)   
1. Baeza Has Failed To Show The Alternate Method Of J.C.’s 
Testimony Was Inherently Prejudicial 
 
Before a district court may allow a child witness to testify via an alternate 
method the district court must find “by clear and convicting evidence” that the 
                                            
2 On appeal, Baeza does not argue that the Uniform Child Witness Testimony by 
Alternative Methods Act, I.C. § 9-1801 et seq. is unconstitutional.  Before the 
district court, Baeza asserted that the Act violated his right to confront witnesses 
and the procedure violated his due process and presumption of innocence rights.  
(See, R., pp. 171-175, 410-411.)  The district court rejected both arguments.  
(See, R., pp. 193-199, 410-411.)  Baeza does not raise the constitutionality of 
the Act on appeal, but instead only argues that using a closed-circuit television 
for J.C.’s testimony violated Baeza’s due process and presumption of innocence 
rights.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-20.)   
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child would “suffer serious emotional trauma that would substantially impair the 
child’s ability to communicate with the finder of fact” if the child was forced to 
testify either “face-to-face” with the defendant or in an “open forum.”  See I.C. § 
9-1805.   
Tami Kammer, a licensed clinical professional counselor, testified that she 
is treating J.C. for sexual trauma and J.C. is suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  (1/16/14 Tr., p. 13, L. 12 – p. 14, L. 22.)  Ms. Kammer testified that it 
would re-traumatize J.C. to require her to testify in open court and J.C. was 
afraid of Baeza.  (1/16/14 Tr., p. 14, L. 23 – p. 15, L. 18,  p. 16, Ls. 14-17.)  Ms. 
Kammer testified that she did not recommend that J.C. testify in open court or in 
front of the defendant.  (1/16/14 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 18-22.)  The district court found: 
The Court accepts the testimony of Ms. Kammer and finds 
accordingly.  The Court concludes by clear and convincing 
evidence that the child would suffer serious emotional trauma that 
would substantially impair the child’s ability to communicate with 
the finder of fact if required to be confronted face-to-face by the 
defendant.  An alternative form of testimony will be allowed. 
 
(R., pp. 195-196, see also R., p. 413 (“[T]here is clear and convicting evidence 
that the child would suffer serious emotional trauma that would substantially 
impair her ability to communicate with the jury if she is required to be confronted 
face-to-face by the Defendant.”).)  Baeza does not challenge these findings on 
appeal.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-28.)   
Once the standard under Idaho Code § 9-1805 is met, then the district 
court determines whether to allow a child to present testimony in an alternate 
method by considering seven factors.  See I.C. § 9-1806. 
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I.C. § 9-1806. Factors for determining whether to permit 
alternative method 
 
If the presiding officer determines that a standard under section 9-
1805, Idaho Code, has been met, the presiding officer shall 
determine whether to allow the presentation of the testimony of a 
child witness by an alternative method and in doing so shall 
consider: 
 
(1) Alternative methods reasonably available; 
(2) Available means for protecting the interests of or 
reducing emotional trauma to the child without resort to an 
alternative method; 
(3) The nature of the case; 
(4) The relative rights of the parties; 
(5) The importance of the proposed testimony of the child; 
(6) The nature and degree of emotional trauma that the child 
may suffer if an alternative method is not used; and 
(7) Any other relevant factor. 
 
I.C. § 9-1806.  The district court considered all seven factors.  (See R., p. 196 
(“The Court has thoroughly considered all of the factors listed in I.C. § 9-1806.”), 
p. 413 (“[T]his court has considered the factors in I.C. Sec. 9-1806.”).)  During 
this consideration, the district court acknowledged that “Defendant’s rights take 
priority over the other interests in the case.”  (R., p. 414.)   
The district court determined that J.C. would be placed in a separate room 
and would testify via closed-circuit television because “this appears to best 
protect the rights of the Defendant while avoiding face-to-face contact between 
the child and the Defendant.”  (R., p. 414.3)  The district court ordered:  
                                            
3 The district court modeled the closed-circuit television testimony procedures 
upon the provisions of Idaho Criminal Code 43.3.  (R., pp. 414-415.)  Idaho 
Criminal Rule 43.3 provides that forensic testimony in a criminal case may be 
offered by video teleconference.  See I.C.R. 43.3.  The state is unaware of any 
case law holding that taking video testimony pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
43.3 is inherently prejudicial to the defendant.    
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1. The child, if called as a witness, will be allowed to testify via 
closed-circuit television. 
 
2. The room where the witness is must be in the courthouse. 
 
3. The child must be visible to the court, defendant, counsel, jury, 
and others physically present in the courtroom. 
 
4. The court (attorneys conducting the questioning) and witness 
must be able to see and hear each other simultaneously and 
communicate with each other during the testimony, however, the 
camera will be set in such a way that the Defendant is not seen by 
the child. If this is impossible, the court will reconsider this decision 
and traditional face-to-face testimony may be required. 
 
5. The Defendant must be able to consult privately with counsel as 
in any other case. 
 
6. In addition to an interpreter and videographer, a victim witness 
coordinator will be allowed in the room while the child is testifying. It 
is expected that any support personnel will be visible on camera. A 
bailiff will be present and will report any contact with the witness 
that might be out of view of the camera. The court wants further 
clarification and discussion of who will be in the room during 
testimony, which will be easier to clarify once the details of the 
closed-circuit logistics are in place. If the child’s parents are 
allowed in the room they need to be visible at least to the bailiff if 
not on camera. 
 
Other child-friendly procedures may be used, as in child friendly 
oath, a coloring book, and the like. 
 
(R., pp. 41-416.)  The district court took great care in crafting the alternate 
method to make sure Baeza’s rights were protected. (See R., pp. 413-416.)   
On appeal, Baeza claims the district court erred by ordering this alternate 
method because “allowing J.C. to testify by closed circuit television was 
inherently prejudicial.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)  Baeza argues that the jury 
would infer that the child needed to be protected from the defendant or that the 
child would suffer serious emotional trauma from testifying in the presence of the 
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defendant and this impermissibly infringed upon Baeza’s presumption of 
innocence.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-20.)  Baeza’s argument regarding what 
“implicit messages” the jury potentially received from the closed-circuit television 
testimony ignores the explicit messages (instructions) given to the jury by the 
district court.   
The district court twice told the jury that the court was using “child-friendly 
procedures” when J.C. was testifying and not to give J.C.’s testimony different 
weight because of these “child-friendly procedures.”   
Do not give any different weight to [J.C.’s] testimony because of the 
child-friendly procedures used during her testimony. 
 
(8/12/14 Tr., p. 333, L. 19 – p. 334, L. 4; 8/14/14 Tr., p. 672, Ls. 20-22.)  J.C. 
was six years old when she testified.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 363, Ls. 15-16.)  No other 
small child testified during the course of the trial.4  The appellate court presumes 
that the jury followed the instructions given by the district court.  See State v. 
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 445, 348 P.3d 1, 60 (2015); State v. Byington, 132 
Idaho 597, 608, 977 P.2d 211, 222 (Ct. App. 1998).  The district court did not 
inform the jury J.C. was testifying via closed-circuit television to protect J.C. from 
emotional harm or from Baeza.  Compare State v. Wright, 153 Idaho 478, 488, 
283 P.3d 795, 805 (Ct. App. 2012) (the district court erred when it specifically 
drew the jury’s attention to the defendant’s restraints by stating: “For the record, 
so there’s no question as far as what’s going on, there’s been a little fuss over 
the break and I’ve required that Mr. Wright be restrained.  If he behaves himself 
                                            
4 Baeza’s daughter testified, but at 12 years old, she was significantly older than 
the six-year-old J.C.   
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here in a while, we’ll loosen that up.”).  Instead, the jury was told that the reason 
J.C. testified via closed-circuit television was because that procedure was “child-
friendly.”   
Even without the explicit instruction from the district court the jury could 
have easily believed that the closed-circuit television did not have anything to do 
with the defendant, but rather was just part of taking the testimony of a small 
child.  See e.g. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986).  In Flynn, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the presence of additional guards during 
trial “need not be interpreted as a sign that [the defendant] is particularly 
dangerous or culpable. Jurors may just as easily believe that the officers are 
there to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom or to 
ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do not erupt into violence.”  Id. at 569.  
The same is true here.  It is easy for jurors to believe that the district court made 
allowances for a six-year-old to testify by alternate means because of her young 
age – and not that the defendant is particularly dangerous or culpable.  J.C. was 
given a child-friendly oath during her testimony, she was given crayons, she was 
allowed a coloring book, and a support person was allowed to be present during 
her testimony.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 335, Ls. 2-4, p. 345, Ls. 3-13; R., pp. 415-416.)  
Regardless what the jurors could have “inferred” the district court explicitly 
informed the jury that the reason for the alternate method of J.C.’s testimony was 
because it was “child-friendly.”   
The state is unaware of any controlling Idaho precedent regarding 
whether use of a closed-circuit television deprives a defendant of his 
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presumption of innocence.5  However, at least two other jurisdictions have held 
that allowing a child witness to testify via closed-circuit television does not 
deprive a defendant of his presumption of innocence because the jury could 
believe that it was simply a child friendly way of taking testimony.  See 
Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 292 (Md. Ct. App. 1987); Marx v. State, 953 
S.W. 321, 331-332 (Tx. Ct. App., 1997).  In Wildermuth, the appellate court 
determined that a jury could easily have assumed that a closed-circuit television 
was a procedure to reduce the child’s trauma of testifying in court.  Wildermuth, 
530 A.2d at 292. 
Nor do we think that the use of the closed-circuit television 
necessarily suggests anything about a defendant’s culpability. The 
jury was instructed not to give the televised testimony any greater 
or lesser weight than if it had been given in the courtroom. It might 
well have assumed that televising a child’s testimony was simply a 
procedure used to reduce the trauma any child might suffer through 
public testimony. We are not persuaded that this procedure tended 
to brand McKoy as guilty. The Supreme Court of Iowa reached the 
same conclusion (with respect to use of an analogous screening 
procedure) in State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 735. Accordingly, we 
reject this contention. 
 
Id.   
                                            
5 The closest case on point is State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 338, 256 P.3d 735, 
746 (2011), where the child victim was allowed to testify over closed-circuit 
television.  In Folk, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that requiring the 
defendant, who was representing himself, to write out questions for his counsel 
to ask the child on cross examination, violated the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 
338-339, 256 P.3d at 746-747.  Also, the district court did not make a finding that 
having the child testifying in the presence of the defendant would result in the 
child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child could not reasonably 
communicate.  Id.  Here Baeza was not restricted in his cross-examination and 
the district court found that the child would suffer serious emotional distress such 
that the child could not reasonably communicate.  (See R., pp. 195-196, 413-
414.)   
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Even when a court found that closed-circuit television could potentially 
affect a defendant’s presumption of innocence, it held that the importance of 
protecting children outweighs any potential negative inference when the jury is 
instructed regarding the testimony.  See Marx, 953 S.W. at 331-332.  In Marx, 
the district court informed the jury that “the testimony of children in these types of 
cases can be taken by what we call closed circuit television[.]”  Id. at 331.  The 
Texas Court of Appeals held that this instruction “likely conveyed to the jury the 
state’s general desire to protect children form the intimidating courtroom 
demeanor rather than implying that the procedure was being used in this 
particular case due to circumstances involving this particular defendant.”  Id.  
The same is true here.  The instructions to the jury conveyed that the procedures 
being used were “child-friendly” and did not indicate the procedures were being 
used in this particular case due to this particular defendant.  Baeza has failed to 
show that the district court violated his due process rights when it permitted J.C. 
to testify using child friendly procedures.  
 
2. The United States Supreme Court Has Held The State Has A 
Compelling Interest In Protecting Child Victims Of Sexual Assault 
From The Trauma Of Testifying In Court 
 
Baeza argues that the alternate method of J.C.’s testimony was not 
necessary to advance an essential state policy.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-
23.)  It is not clear from the cases cited by Baeza or the applicable statutes that 
the district court is required to find an “essential state policy” before it allows an 
alternate form of testimony.  See, e.g., I.C. §§ 9-1805-1806.  For example, Idaho 
Criminal Rule 43.3 allows an alternate method of testimony without any 
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“essential state policy” finding.  See I.C.R. 43.3.  Even if the district court is 
required to find a necessary state interest, the United States Supreme Court has 
found that the state’s interest in protecting minor victims of sex crime from further 
trauma and embarrassment is a “compelling” one.  See Maryland v. Craig, 497 
U.S. 836, 852 (1990).  In Craig, the United States Supreme Court analyzed a 
statute allowing a child victim to testify via alternate means and held that the 
state has a “transcendent interest” in protecting children such that it would allow 
the use of a special procedure for child testimony.  See id. at 853.   
Given the State’s traditional and “‘transcendent interest in 
protecting the welfare of children,’” and buttressed by the growing 
body of academic literature documenting the psychological trauma 
suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in court, we will not 
second-guess the considered judgment of the Maryland Legislature 
regarding the importance of its interest in protecting child abuse 
victims from the emotional trauma of testifying. Accordingly, we 
hold that, if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the 
state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of 
testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the 
use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such 
cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-
to-face confrontation with the defendant. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).   
Baeza argues the use of the closed-circuit television “undermined, rather 
than protected, the central concern of the presumption of innocence.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 21.)  However, Baeza is unable to deny that the State has a 
compelling and necessary interest in protecting child victims of sexual assault 
from the trauma of testifying.  Because the state’s interest is compelling, and 
because the procedures used were not inherently prejudicial, Baeza has failed to 
show a violate of his due process rights.   
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3. Even If It Was Error To Allow J.C. To Testify Via Alternate Means The 
Error Was Harmless Because The Outcome Of The Trial Would Have 
Been The Same If J.C.’s Testimony Was Taken In The “Normal” Way 
 
It was not error to allow J.C. to testify via closed-circuit television.  
However, even if permitting the alternate method of testimony was error, it was 
harmless error and the result of the trial would have been the same had J.C.’s 
testimony been taken in the “normal” way.  “Where a defendant alleges error at 
trial that he contemporaneously objected to, this Court reviews the error on 
appeal under the harmless error test.”  State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 600-01, 
301 P.3d 242, 258-259 (2013) (citation omitted).  “[T]he error is harmless if the 
Court finds that the result would be the same without the error.”  Id. at 598, 301 
P.3d at 256 (citation omitted).  Baeza argues that the closed-circuit television 
testimony altered the result of the trial because this method infringed on his 
presumption of innocence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-25.)   
For the reasons articulated above, allowing six-year-old J.C. to testify via 
closed-circuit television is not inherently prejudicial and any potential prejudice 
was ameliorated by the district court’s repeated instructions.  Further, Baeza’s 
argument does not address the substantial evidence of his guilt.  J.C. testified 
that Baeza touched her private parts, under her clothes, with his finger.  (8/12/14 
Tr., p. 343, L. 6 – p. 344, L. 4, p. 347, Ls. 2-5.6)  J.C.’s mother, Ms. Patlan-
Baeza, testified that when J.C. got back from Baeza’s house J.C. went straight to 
the bathroom and Ms. Patlan-Baeza saw a toilet bowl full of blood.  (8/12/14 Tr., 
p. 371, L. 20 – p. 372, L. 2.)  When Ms. Patlan-Baeza checked J.C.’s underwear, 
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she saw that J.C.’s underwear was bloody and saw blood on J.C.’s vagina.  
(8/12/14 Tr., p. 372, Ls. 6-21.)  Ms. Patlan-Baeza testified that J.C. told her that 
Baeza touched her.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 372, L. 24 – p. 375, L. 7.)  Antonio Corona, 
J.C.’s father, testified that J.C. also told him that Baeza stuck his fingers in her 
vagina.  (8/12/14 Tr., p. 409, Ls. 1-4.)  Dr. Robertson testified that she observed 
a small abrasion inside of J.C.’s vagina.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 544, Ls. 4-25.)  The 
abrasion could be caused by something penetrating the vagina.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 
550, Ls. 18-24.)  Sergeant Ornales testified that Baeza eventually admitted it 
was possible that his hand could have slipped under J.C.’s underwear and made 
penetration.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 475, L. 11 – p. 477, L. 11.)  Angela Brady, a nurse 
at the Saint Luke’s emergency room, testified that J.C. told her that Baeza 
caused her injuries.  (8/13/14 Tr., p. 529, Ls. 19-25.)   
In light of the above evidence and the instructions that directed the jury 
not to give J.C.’s testimony any different weight, any potential error regarding the 
method by which J.C. testified was harmless.  Having J.C. testify via closed-
circuit television did not affect the outcome of the trial.   
 
D. Baeza’s Alternative Argument – That The District Court Did Not Address 
All Of The Factors Under Idaho Code § 9-1806 Is Not Preserved And 
Fails On The Merits 
 
Under Idaho Code § 9-1806, the district court is required to examine 
seven factors, including “[t]he relative rights of the parties.”  I.C. § 9-1806(4).  
Baeza argues, in the alternative that the district court did not “adequately 
                                                                                                                                  
6 Baeza does not argue that use of the closed-circuit television altered the 
substance of J.C.’s testimony.  
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consider the relative rights of the parties under I.C. § 9-1806” before allowing 
J.C. to testify by closed-circuit television “because it did not address Mr. Baeza’s 
due process assertion that his rights to a fair trial and the presumption of 
innocence would be violated.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-26.)   
 Baeza’s argument fails for several reasons.  First, he has not preserved 
this argument for appeal.  Baeza did not argue below that the district court failed 
to consider his due process rights when weighing the relative rights under Idaho 
Code § 9-1806(4).  “Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered 
for the first time on appeal.”  State v. Wilson, 159 Idaho 412, __ 361 P.3d 1275, 
1277 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 
126 (1992)).  In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that an “appellate court should reverse an unobjected-to 
error when the defendant persuades the court that the alleged error: (1) violates 
one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or 
obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings.”  Id. (citing Perry, 150 at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.)  Here Baeza claims 
for the first time on appeal that the district court “did not adequately consider the 
relative rights of the parties under I.C. § 9-1806 before ordering the alternative 
method of allowing J.C. to testify by closed circuit television.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 25.)  A statutory violation does not rise to the level of violating the defendant’s 
constitutional rights and thus Baeza fails the first prong of the Perry fundamental 
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error test.  See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980 (where the error relates 
to violation of a rule or statute the fundamental error doctrine is not invoked).   
 Second, even if preserved, Baeza’s argument fails because the district 
court did properly consider all seven factors, including the relative rights of the 
parties and considered Baeza’s due process rights.  (See R., p. 196 (“The Court 
has thoroughly considered all of the factors listed in I.C. § 9-1806.”), p. 413 
(“[T]his court has considered the factors in I.C. Sec. 9-1806.”).)  The district court 
went through all of the factors, including determining that “Defendant’s rights 
take priority over the other interests in the case.”  (R., p. 414; see also 7/1/14 Tr., 
p. 42, L. 20-p. 43, L. 4.)  When it was analyzing all of the factors, the district 
court determined that placing a screen in front of Baeza was “unduly prejudicial.”  
(R., p. 197.)  The district court also considered Baeza’s rights and changed the 
method of alternate testimony to better protect Baeza’s rights.  (R., pp. 414-415.)  
This change in alternate method was, in part, to address Baeza’s due process 
rights.  (R., p. 415 (“Additionally all of the rights to due process and 
communication with an attorney are important[.]”).)  The district court also took 
care to make sure J.C.’s testimony was “more like a regular witness examination” 
by putting only J.C. in a separate room, that way the defendant, jury, court and 
counsel would see the same thing.  (R., p. 415.)  Additionally, the district court 
considered Baeza’s due process rights because the district court instructed the 
jury not to give any different weight to J.C.’s testimony.  This instruction 
addressed the due process concern that the jury may give different weight to 
J.C.’s testimony due to the alternate method used to take her testimony.  (See 
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8/14/14 Tr., p. 672, Ls. 20-22.)  Contrary to Baeza’s argument, the district court 
considered all of the factors under I.C. § 9-1806 and took care to consider the 
relative rights of the parties including Baeza’s due process rights.   
 Finally, even if the court erred by not specifically articulating its 
consideration of Baeza’s “presumption of innocence claim,” the error is harmless.  
This court freely reviews application of constitutional principles to facts.  For the 
reasons set forth in Section C, supra, application of those principles to 
undisputed facts of this case shows no due process violation.   
 
CONCLUSION 
  
  The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 DATED this 19th day of January, 2016. 
 
       
  /s/ Ted S. Tollefson____ 
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